We model an innovator's choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi-period licensing game with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer. We …nd that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more pro…table than …xed-fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion. Moreover, licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than …xed-fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where sequential innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak. Our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods. (JEL D86, L13, L24) 
Technology transfer through licensing is a common method to utilize a patent. A large literature on technology licensing has studied the optimal payment scheme of selling a costreducing innovation (Arrow 1962 , Kamien and Tauman 1984 , Katz and Shapiro 1986 , Kamien, Oren and Tauman 1992 ; see Kamien 1992 for a survey). It has been shown that licensing by means of a royalty is inferior to that of a …xed-fee or an auction for an outside innovator, regardless of the industry size or the magnitude of the innovation.
Subsequent studies have tried to explain the wide prevalence of royalties in practice by examining the many variants of the standard model. These studies include models with asymmetric information (Gallini and Wright 1990; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992; Poddar and Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005) , variation in the quality of innovation (Rockett, 1990) , product di¤erentiation (Muto, 1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Poddar and Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos and Tauman, 2003) , moral hazard (Macho-Stadler, MartinezGiralt and Perez-Castrillo, 1996; Choi, 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001) , risk aversion (Bousquet, Cremer, Ivaldi and Wolkowicz, 1998) , incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998 Wang, , 2002 Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen, 2002; Sen and Tauman, 2003) , Stackelberg leadership (Filippini, 2001; Kabiraj, 2004 Kabiraj, , 2005 or strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002 ).
However, surprisingly few studies have examined the duration of technology licensing, even though it is an important dimension of every contract. More concretely, should the innovator license the innovation for the entire length of the patent, or should a series of shortterm contracts be used? While existing theoretical models implicitly assume that a license remains in e¤ect for the duration of the patent, most actual contract agreements terminate before the underlying patents expire. Anand and Khanna (2000) study the structure of licensing contracts that involved at least one US participant and were signed during the period 1990-93. They …nd that no contract agreement lasts more than 10 years, even though the length of patent protection ranges from 14 to 20 years in the US.
A more interesting fact is the variation in the duration of licensing contracts. MachoStadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996) study a sample of 241 contracts between Spanish and foreign …rms and …nd that contracts based on royalties tend to have a longer duration than …xed-fee contracts. Of the contracts containing …xed payments, 24.5% are oneyear contracts, while this proportion falls to 6.2% in the set of contracts containing royalty payments. At the other extreme, 58% of the 174 contracts with royalty payments are longterm contracts (at least …ve years), while only 15% of the contracts with …xed payments had a duration of at least …ve years. Using the same dataset, Mendi (2005) studies the impact of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in technology transfer. He …nds a positive relationship between contract duration and the probability of the parties including royalties in the …rst period of the agreement.
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In this paper, we introduce a model of technology licensing that analyzes the duration of contracts as well as the optimal payment scheme. We focus on an outsider innovator's optimal licensing policy in a setting with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfers. We …nd that it can be optimal to issue a license for less than the length of the patent; even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion, royalty can be more pro…table than …xed-fee licensing. Moreover, licensing contracts based on royalty tend to have a longer duration and are more likely to be used in industries where sequential innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak. These …ndings are broadly consistent with the stylized empirical facts. 2 Our model builds on two observations. First, technology advances are destructive. A new innovation often renders past ones obsolete. This means that an innovator who engages in a series of innovations potentially faces a time-consistency problem in technology licensing: once a license is sold, the innovator may have an excessive incentive to invest in new technologies. This decreases the value of the initial license. At the same time, it may be too costly to write a complete long-term contract in which license fees are contingent upon 1 The author also provides a theoretical model to explain the …nding, but it di¤ers from ours in many aspects, among which the most crucial is that the duration of contract is exogenous in his but not in ours. 2 The empirical support for the …nding that relates the use of royalty to sequential innovations and intellectual property protection is discussed in Section IV.D. the outcome of risky investments for future improvements (Williamson 1975) . Therefore, a long-term …xed-fee license may be sub-optimal.
Second, the transfer of knowledge is irreversible. Once transferred, it is di¢ cult for the innovator to retract the knowledge from a licensee (Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983; Brousseau, Coeurderoy and Chaserant 2007) . This means that a licensee may be able to utilize an innovation even after the license has expired. We call this "technology leakage"
and model it as the licensee retaining a fraction of the cost savings of the initial innovation without renewing the license.
3 Conceptually, we can think of a technology as embodying both tangible assets and intangible know-how. While the termination of a license may stop the use of tangible assets by past licensees, it is di¢ cult, if possible at all, to prevent them from utilizing the technology know-how. The existence of technology leakage creates a potential downside for short-term contracts.
The innovator's problem in our model is reminiscent of the classic time-consistency problem of a durable goods monopolist (Coase 1972 , Waldman 1996 , Rey and Tirole 2007 .
Indeed, one can view the choice of short-term contracts by the innovator as analogous to the rental solution for the durable goods monopolist. 4 However, there is a fundamental di¤erence between the transfer of intellectual property and the rental of a durable good: whereas for the latter the use of the property is immediately terminated upon its physical removal at the conclusion of the contract, it is not so for the former. To quote Richard Posner (2005) , "Because intellectual property is readily appropriable simply by being copied (in contrast to a rental car, for example, which can be appropriated only by being stolen), preserving one's property rights when one licenses intellectual property is often di¢ cult." This means that a series of short-term contracts are su¢ cient in resolving a durable goods monopolist's commitment problem, but not an innovator's. The main novelty of our paper is to capture this 3 Our use of the term "technology leakage" should be distinguished from the occasional uses in newspaper articles (e.g., "Expulsions Tied To Fear Of Technology Leaks", Philip Taubman, New York Times, April 24, 1983 ) that refer to the more blatant theft of technologies. In our model, technology leakage is not illegal and is present only because intellectual property protection is imperfect. 4 To push the analogy further, royalty corresponds to "metering" used by a durable goods monopolist to approximate the rental outcome (Burstein 1960 , Bulow 1982 observation by formally modelling technology leakage and studying its role in the design of licensing contracts.
In our model, there are two periods. An innovator sells licenses, which can last a single period or two periods, by either …xed fees or royalties. Whereas long-term …xed-fee contracts potentially prevent technology leakage, they distort the innovator's incentive to invest in subsequent innovations. Short-term …xed-fee contracts or long-term …xed-fee contracts with opt-out clauses do better, but each is unable to entirely resolve the time-consistency problem because of technology leakage. Long-term royalty contracts do not have a time-consistency problem, but royalty does not maximize the value of the initial innovation. Based on these tradeo¤s, we derive conditions under which it is optimal for the innovator to license the technology for less than the length of the patent and conditions under which the uses of royalty contracts are optimal.
To our knowledge, Gandal and Rockett (1995) and Antelo (2009) are the only theoretical papers that have examined the optimal duration of licensing contracts. 5 The …rst paper focuses on the licensing of a sequence of exogenous innovations by …xed fees. They derive conditions under which the innovator licenses the initial technology bundled with all future improvements and conditions under which licenses to each innovation are sold period-byperiod. The other paper focuses on royalties in a model of asymmetric information, in which a licensee's output in a short-term contract signals her cost. Neither paper compares di¤erent payment schemes, nor are they concerned with the innovator's time-consistency and technology leakage problems identi…ed in this paper. (2008) consider a variable royalty rate, contingent upon the outcome of a court challenge of the validity of the patent. In their model, the innovator o¤ers licenses to all downstream …rms by assumption, therefore a …xed-fee license is o¤ered only if the downstream …rm has no competition. In an extension of their model, they consider short-term licenses, which are contracts that do not survive a …nding of validity.
6 A number of papers study the optimal patent policy in markets with sequential innovation (Green and Scotchmer 1995 , Scotchmer 1996 , O'Donoghue, 1998 , Besen and Maskin, 2000 , Denicolo 2002 . In these models, a sequence of innovations is undertaken by di¤erent …rms rather than being concentrated in one …rm and their focus is on the length and breadth of patents. Oster (1996) is the only other paper that considers the optimal licensing scheme under sequential innovation. By way of an example, she explores the strategic opportunities created by exclusive licensing in a research-intensive market with sequential innovations, but contracts are short-term by assumption in her model. Our conceptualization of technology leakage is also related to papers by Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) and Choi (2001) , who have developed incomplete contract models of a licensing relationship that is susceptible to moral hazard. They assume that the transfer of technology know-how is costly and cannot be contracted directly. A royalty-based contract is optimal because it reduces the innovator's temptation of not actually transferring all the knowhow. While these papers and ours share the prediction that the use of royalty is positively correlated with the amount of know-how involved in technology transfer, there are subtle di¤erences. They implicitly assume that a technology can be transferred without transferring all necessary know-how; our paper complements theirs by assuming that technology knowhow, once transferred, cannot be withdrawn even after the contractual relationship ends.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the environment and assumptions of our model of innovation and licensing. In Section II, we consider a simple example to illustrate the basic intuition. In Section III, we solve the innovator's period 2 problem. In Section IV, we …nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1 and report comparative statics results. In Section V, we discuss the robustness of our results. Section VI concludes. Any formal proofs omitted from the main text are contained in the appendix.
I. The Model
We consider an industry consisting of n 2 identical …rms all producing the same good with a linear cost function, C(q) = c 0 q, where q is the quantity produced and c 0 > 0 is the constant marginal cost of production. In addition to the n …rms, there is an innovator that engages in a series of innovations. She seeks to license the innovations to all or some of the n …rms so as to maximize her pro…t.
The game lasts two periods. At the beginning of period 1, the innovator owns a patent on a cost-reducing innovation, which reduces the marginal cost of production from c 0 to c 1 :
The patent is valid for both periods. At the beginning of period 2, the innovator can make Following Waldman (1996), we assume that the probability of a successful second innovation is Pr and it increases with the amount of investment I. For ease of exposition, we assign a particular functional form to Pr(I) such that it equals 2 p I; where
innovator stops all R&D activities after two periods and the game ends. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the game.
In each period, the inverse demand function of the industry is given by p = maxf0; a Qg;
where a > c 0 and Q is the total production level. 8 Denote by p M (c) the monopoly price in the downstream market when the marginal cost is c; we assume that the initial innovation is drastic, i.e., p M (c 1 ) < c 0 ; 9 but the second innovation can be drastic or non-drastic, i.e., p M (c 2 ) can be below or above c 1 .
In order to model technology leakage, we assume that if a downstream …rm that licenses the technology c 1 in period 1 does not license any innovation in period 2, its marginal cost of production in period 2 is c 0 2 [c 1 ; c 0 ). According to this assumption, a licensee can retain 7 This guarantees that the optimal amount of investment will be an interior solution. Our qualitative results will not change if a more general form of the function is adopted. 8 Only some of our results rely on the assumption of a linear demand, which is the most often used demand function in the technology licensing literature. They will be clearly indicated where applicable.
The assumption of a constant market demand is for ease of exposition, but our model can be easily extended to allow shifts in market demand across periods, as shown in Section V.C. 9 In the case of a drastic innovation, the granting of an exclusive license o¤ers such a large cost advantage that the licensee can e¤ectively monopolize the industry (Arrow, 1962) . The case of non-drastic initial innovations is discussed in Section V. some fraction of the cost saving from the initial technology transfer, even if he does not license that technology in period 2.
Our main interest is in the innovator's choice of period 1 licensing contracts. We assume that the amount of investment is not observable to outside parties; hence it cannot be contracted upon. While it is possible to write a contract that is contingent upon the outcome of the period 2 innovation, it costs ' to write such a contract. 10 Since we do not explicitly model the transaction cost ' and its impact on the choice of contracts is rather obvious, we assume that ' is so large that a contingent contract is never optimal. 11 Therefore, we only consider licenses that specify the payment scheme, the number of licensees and the duration of the contract.
In both periods, the innovator licenses her innovations to k n …rms either by a …xed-fee or by a royalty. 12 The duration of a license issued in period 1 can be either one period (short-term) or two periods (long-term). This means that there are four possible types of licensing contracts: short-term …xed fee (SF ) ; long-term …xed-fee (LF ) ; short-term royalty (SR) and long-term royalty (LR) : If the license is a long-term …xed-fee contract, it speci…es a payment plan (f 1 ; f 2 ) ; where f 1 and f 2 are fees due at the beginning of period 1 and 2, respectively. 13 If the license is a royalty contract, then it speci…es the royalty rate r for each unit that a licensee sells. All individuals maximize their expected total pro…ts, with a common discount factor of : Our solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium. 10 There are a variety of reasons why conditional contracts may be even more costly. For example, there may be search costs associated with thinking through the contracts'implications (Klein 2002) or simply ink costs associated with writing lengthy contracts (Dye 1985) . The costs become even more pronounced in an auction setting, which necessarily involves multiple parties.
11 To be more speci…c, it su¢ ces for ' to be greater than ( 1 2 ) 2 ; where 1 and 2 are de…ned in Section III.B.a. 12 Since contracts based on an auction are typically associated with a …xed-fee payment, for conciseness, we lump contracts based on a …xed fee or an auction together and call them …xed-fee contracts. In fact, since contracts based on a …xed fee are dominated by contracts based on an auction when buyers are symmetric (Kamien and Tauman 1986 , Katz and Shapiro 1986 , it su¢ ces for us to consider only the latter type of contracts and this is the approach that we have taken, except where noted, in this paper. When buyers are asymmetric, a …xed-fee policy can be more pro…table than an auction policy (Stamatopoulos and Tauman 2008, Miao 2009) . 13 By o¤ering a payment plan, the innovator gives a licensee the right to terminate the contract in period 2 without paying the second installment f 2 .
Here is a collection of notations that will be used throughout the paper. LS(k) : Gross licensing revenue from a single-innovation game for licensing scheme LS 2 fR; F F g, where R is royalty, F F is …xed-fee, and k 2 Z + denotes the number of licensees.
LS(k) t
: The innovator's gross licensing revenue at time t for licensing scheme LS 2 fSF; LF; SR; LRg and k 2 Z + denotes the number of licensees. For notational simplicity, we drop the superscript when doing so is unambiguous; particularly in period 2, since there are two innovation outcomes, for each licensing scheme we use 2 to denote the period 2 gross licensing revenue if the new innovation is unsuccessful and 0 2 the revenue if it is successful.
The innovator's period 2 R&D incentive largely depends on the di¤erence between 2 and 0 2 and we denote it by : LS : The innovator's maximal pro…t (licensing revenue net of the investment) for licensing scheme LS 2 fSF; LF; SR; LRg. We also denote by B the total pro…t for a vertically integrated innovator.
II. An Example: The Period 2 Innovation is Drastic
In the standard one-innovation setting, a …xed-fee license for the duration of the patent is optimal, but this result does not extend to a model with sequential innovations. The reason is that the innovator has an incentive to over-invest when presented with the opportunity for new innovations; moreover, this time-consistency problem cannot be solved by a series of short-term contracts due to technology leakage. The intuition is best illustrated by a simple example, in which the period 2 innovation is also drastic, i.e., p
we must have p M (c 2 ) < c 0 . Hence a …rm who licenses the new innovation will become an e¤ective monopoly in period 2. This means that the innovator can sell an exclusive license on the new innovation for a fee equal to the period 2 monopoly pro…t. 14 To put it di¤erently, although technology leakage may weaken the innovator's bargaining position in period 2, it has no such impact should she succeed in the new innovation. It is this feature that makes the example particularly tractable and illustrative.
The innovator's incentive to invest in the period 2 innovation is driven by the payo¤ di¤erence from the two outcomes of the innovation. The optimal level of investment is obtained when the innovator is either vertically integrated with a downstream …rm or able to commit to an investment level in period 2 at the time when period 1 licenses are issued.
Under either of these circumstances the incentive to invest is driven by the payo¤ di¤erence
However, if the innovator is neither vertically integrated nor able to commit, then the outcome of a successful innovation may become more attractive. Suppose that the initial license is a standard long-term exclusive contract with an upfront fee, then the innovator receives no income in period 2 unless the new innovation is successful. This means that her incentive to innovate will be driven by M (c 2 ). Therefore, the innovator has an incentive to over-invest in period 2, relative to the investment level she would choose if she were able to commit in period 1. Now suppose that the initial license is a short-term …xed-fee exclusive contract. The original licensee is not willing to pay the entire monopoly pro…t from renewing the license in period 2 because she will enjoy some of the cost savings from the innovation even if she does not renew the license. Further, her possession of the leaked technology means that no other …rm will be willing to pay the entire monopoly pro…t. Thus, the innovator is unable to receive the entire monopoly pro…t as licensing revenue in period 2. Let the revenue loss from leakage be 1 ; the innovator's incentive to innovate will be driven by
Therefore, the innovator still has an incentive to over-invest in period 2, but the degree of over-investment is smaller.
This example gives us the basic intuition why a short-term …xed-fee contract may be preferred to a long-term …xed fee contract and why neither contract can achieve the …rst-best outcome. In the standard long-term …xed-fee contract with upfront payments, the innovator faces a classic time-consistency problem: Once a license is sold, the innovator is then tempted to invest in new technologies that render the initial license obsolete; expecting this, …rms will pay less for the license. At the same time, a short-term contract entails technology leakage;
so the innovator has an incentive to choose an investment level to minimize the negative impact of technology leakage, but this investment level generally deviates from the optimal.
Of course, the above analysis is far from complete. Clearly, the innovator may want to structure a contract that deals with the time-consistency problem. Since the initial license will be worthless once the period 2 innovation succeeds, a possible solution is to use an installment payment plan, in which the second installment is paid only if a licensee wishes to continue the contract. It is easy to see that the second installment has to be as high as M (c 1 ) in order for the innovator to overcome her excessive incentive to invest, but for a payment this high the original licensee will terminate the contract even if the period 2 innovation fails. In other words, a long-term contract that stipulates an opt-out clause with a high continuation fee e¤ectively becomes a short-term contract, which may alleviate the time-consistency problem but not eliminate it. This and other points will be discussed in more detail when we solve the complete model.
III. Investment and Licensing in Period 2
We solve the game via backward induction. In this section, we consider the innovator's period 2 problem. We …rst …nd the optimal licensing scheme under a cost asymmetry. It allows us to more precisely de…ne the cost of technology leakage. We then derive the optimal investment level at the beginning of period 2.
A. Licensing Under Cost Asymmetry
In period 2, downstream …rms are no longer identical in their pre-licensing costs. Licensees of the initial innovation will have lower marginal costs than non-licensees, either because the former has signed long-term contracts or because of technology leakage. Here we focus on a scenario that is relevant to our model, in which an exclusive license is granted in period 1 so that the period 2 cost asymmetry is between the original licensee and all others. We show that the optimal licensing scheme under such a cost asymmetry is to once again issue a …xed-fee exclusive license to the original licensee.
Lemma 1 Suppose that …rm 1 has a cost of c a and the other n 1 …rms have a cost of c, where c a c: If an innovation allows a …rm to produce at a cost of c b ; where
then it is optimal to issue an exclusive license to …rm 1 for a …xed fee via a Right of First O¤er.
Proof. Suppose that an optimal licensing scheme S exists, in which …rm 1's net pro…t Therefore, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, …rm 1 accepts the o¤er and the innovator receives M (c b ) 0 as her revenue. This means that a …xed-fee exclusive contract is at least as pro…table as scheme S and is therefore optimal.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. O¤ering an exclusive license to …rm 1 ensures that the market continues to be monopolized so that the industry pro…ts are shared just between the innovator and …rm 1. After leaving …rm 1 a surplus that it could have earned otherwise, the innovator keeps all the gain in the industry pro…ts. In such as case, any licensing scheme that maximizes the industry pro…ts also maximizes the innovator's payo¤. But Lemma 1 does not always hold if
15 It is our assumption that the initial innovation is drastic and thus any improvement upon the initial innovation is also drastic against the old technology that allows us to dwell on this case, which greatly simpli…es our task.
B. The Cost of Technology Leakage
A prominent feature of our model is technology leakage in short-term contracts. Because of technology leakage, the innovator may obtain a smaller licensing revenue in period 2 than she would if the technology transfer were reversible. This loss in period 2 licensing revenue is what we call the cost of technology leakage. Notice that this is not the same as the decrease in total licensing revenue across both periods that results from technology leakage. Potential licensees, expecting technology leakage in period 2, are willing to pay a higher price for the initial license.
De…nition 1 The cost of technology leakage for an innovator is the di¤erence between the licensing revenue she earns in case past licensees retain some of the cost savings, and the licensing revenue in case they do not.
In order to …nd the cost of technology leakage, one compares the innovator's period 2 licensing revenues with and without leakage, which, in general, is not an easy task. However, the comparison in this model is made simpler by the assumption that the initial innovation is drastic. Due to this assumption and the fact that the period 2 innovation is necessarily an improvement over the initial one, without technology leakage the innovator can always sell an exclusive license in period 2 for a fee equal to the monopoly pro…ts. In other words, the period 2 licensing revenue without leakage is M (c 2 ) if the period 2 innovation succeeds or M (c 1 ) if it fails. Therefore, the cost of technology leakage is either
2 .
a. Technology Leakage From an Exclusive License
Moreover, if an exclusive license was issued in period 1, then the cost of technology leakage is exactly equal to the pro…t that the original licensee can earn in period 2. This is because, according to Lemma 1, it is optimal to o¤er a second exclusive license to the original licensee Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions on the costs of technology leakage:
Assumption 1 states that the cost of technology leakage is zero if and only if c b is drastic against c a , i.e., the availability of the new technology renders the leaked technology obsolete.
Assumption 2 states that the value of having an exclusive access to a production technology of c 1 cannot exceed the monopoly pro…t earned with that technology. Assumption 3 further narrows down the range of the costs of technology leakage. In Appendix B, we verify that these assumptions are met in homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models. In Appendix C, we consider more general models in which some of these assumption are not met.
One may wonder whether 2 is always smaller than 1 , since the leakage appears to be less of a concern should the period 2 innovation succeed. The answer is no, due to the integer constraint in the number of licenses that the innovator can sell in period 2. As shown in Appendix B, if the original licensee refuses the o¤er of an exclusive license, then the innovator will auction either 1 or 2 licenses in stage 2 of the period 2 licensing game. For a …xed c a ;
when c b is close to c a ; 2 is the optimal number of licenses to sell in stage 2; when c b decreases, the optimal number of licenses to sell in stage 2 will also decrease and at some point that number will "jump" from 2 to 1, diminishing the threat that can be imposed on the original licensee. It is this discontinuity in the number of licenses that causes the non-monotonicity in the cost of technology leakage, because of which we cannot rule out the possibility that Now we solve the innovator's problem at the investment stage in period 2. Let = 0 2 2 , we have
Lemma 2 The optimal amount of investment is 2 ; the probability of a successful innovation is 2 ; and the innovator's expected pro…t in period 2 is 2 + 2 .
Proof. The innovator's investment decision is max I Pr (I) I = 2 p I I: Denote by I the optimal choice of I; we must have p =I = 1; i.e., I = 2 : So Pr (I ) = 2 and the expected pro…t in period 2 is 2 + Pr (I )
Lemma 2 shows that the innovator's incentive to invest in period 2 is entirely determined by ; the di¤erence in period 2 licensing revenues from the two outcomes. Hence, can serve as a convenient indicator of a licensing scheme's optimality, which we will use repeatedly in this paper. Another result that allows us to easily compare licensing schemes is the following:
Lemma 3 The innovator's expected pro…t in period 2 increases in both 2 and 0 2 :
Proof. The innovator's expected pro…t in period 2 is max I 2 +Pr(I) ( 
IV. Licensing in Period 1
In this section, we …nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1, which is the central concern of this paper. We start with the …rst-best scenario for the innovator, whose solution is then used as our benchmark. Then we solve for the payo¤s associated with each of the possible licensing schemes. We compare them with the benchmark and discuss each scheme's advantages/disadvantages. Finally, we carry out some comparative statics exercises by varying the rate of innovation parameter and the cost of technology leakage.
A. The Benchmark
In a …rst-best scenario, the innovator is vertically integrated with a downstream …rm and sells the …nal output by herself. There is neither a commitment problem nor technology leakage. Since p M (c 2 ) < p M (c 1 ) < c 0 , the innovator can monopolize the industry in both periods. 16 Therefore, her incentive to innovate in period 2 is perfectly aligned with the gain in industry pro…ts, which is M (c 2 ) M (c 1 ).
Proposition 1 If the innovator markets the …nal output by herself, then
M (c 1 ) and her total pro…t is
Proposition 1 gives us the upper bound of licensing revenue that the innovator can obtain, which serves as a useful benchmark in comparing di¤erent licensing schemes. It also provides a necessary condition for any licensing scheme to generate the benchmark pro…ts:
2 ) must be equal to M (c 2 ) M (c 1 ). This is true because the optimal level of investment is proportional to 2 , so the period 2 investment must be ine¢ cient if deviates
Vertical integration is not the only way for the innovator to obtain the benchmark pro…t.
If the transaction cost, '; is zero, then the benchmark outcome can also be achieved via a …xed-fee license whose payments are contingent upon the innovation outcome. Denote by In reality, however, both vertical integration and writing complete contracts may be impractical: a research university may want to keep arms'length from the product market in order to avoid con ‡icts of interest; certain "transaction costs"may prevent future contingencies from being contracted ex ante. Therefore, we must also examine the optimal licensing scheme when the above two options are unavailable.
B. Fixed-fee Licenses
We …rst consider …xed-fee licenses. Since we assume that the initial innovation is drastic, a …xed-fee exclusive license is optimal in an one-innovation model (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Kamien and Tauman 1986 ), but we show in this section that it is generally not true when there are sequential innovations and technology leakage. In so doing, we also solve for the optimal …xed-fee contracts. To streamline our exposition, we restrict our attention to exclusive contracts in period 1. We will verify in Section V. that this restriction is inconsequential.
a. Short-term Fixed-Fee Exclusive License
In a short-term …xed-fee exclusive contract, a licensee has the right to use the cost-reducing technology of c 1 for just one period, during which he earns the monopoly pro…t M (c 1 ).
After the contract expires at the end of period 1, the original licensee enjoys a cost of c 0 < c 0 because of technology leakage, while the other n 1 …rms only have the old technology of c 0 . In period 2, new licensing takes place regardless of whether the innovator is successful in her R&D e¤orts.
Lemma 4 If a short-term …xed-fee exclusive license is o¤ered in period 1, then
; then 1 = 2 = 0 and a short-term …xed-fee exclusive license replicates the benchmark outcome.
(2)
If c 0 > p M (c 1 ) ; then 1 = 2 = 0 by Assumption 1 hence SF = B . It is also easy to verify that the innovator will choose the optimal investment level
2 if she has the ability to commit in period 1.
If the game lasts only one period, then the standard model predicts that a …xed-fee license is optimal (Kamien and Tauman 1986) . Upon …rst glance of our model, extending the game into two periods adds little new: the innovator and potential licensees can contract period by period and this reduces a two-period game into two one-period standard games. However, Lemma 4 tells us that the benchmark outcome can be replicated by a series of short-term contracts only if there is no technology leakage, otherwise technology leakage will cost the innovator ( 1 2 ) 2 ; where 1 2 represents the di¤erence in the costs of technology leakage between the two outcomes of the period 2 innovation.
It should be noted that the innovator's period 2 revenue loss from technology leakage does not directly translate into a loss in total licensing revenue: after all, expecting a leakage, …rms will pay more for the initial license. Rather, it is the innovator's attempt to minimize the revenue loss from leakage that causes a distortion in her incentive to invest in sequential innovations and this lowers a licensee's willingness to pay for the initial innovation. It can be seen most clearly by examining = 0 2 2 ; which equals
under a short-term contract. Thus, as long as the costs of technology leakage are not identical under di¤erent innovation outcomes, the innovator's incentive to invest will deviate from the optimal level. It is this deviation that results in the innovator's loss in total revenue. In other words, the presence of both technology leakage and sequential innovation are essential for short-term …xed-fee contracts not to be able to replicate the benchmark outcome.
b. Long-term Fixed-fee Exclusive License
Now we examine in detail long-term …xed-fee contracts and their optimality. In our simple example, only contracts with an upfront payment are considered and we …nd that longterm …xed-fee contracts entail a time-consistency problem. To deal with the problem, the innovator may choose to add an opt-out clause, which allows a licensee to terminate a longterm contract after the innovation outcome is realized in period 2. More speci…cally, the period 1 contract speci…es the fees to be paid in each of the two periods and we denote them by f 1 and f 2 ; if a licensee opts out the contract in period 2, then the contract terminates and f 2 will not be paid. 17;18 Figure 2 illustrates the period 2 subgame. For the purpose of comparison, we also include the subgame tree for short-term …xed-fee contracts in Figure 2 .
Clearly, a long-term …xed-fee contract (f 1 ; f 2 ) without the opt-out clause is equivalent to a long-term …xed-fee contract (f 1 + f 2 ; 0) with the opt-out clause. This means that any long-term …xed-fee contracts without the opt-out clause are just special cases of a long-term …xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause. Therefore, it su¢ ces to …nd the optimal long-term …xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause. 17 Here we implicitly assume a zero termination fee, but this assumption is without loss of generality, since only the di¤erence in the payments a¤ects a licensee's decision whether to continue or to terminate the contract and the innovator's incentive to invest in a new innovation. If the contract instead speci…es a non-zero termination fee of f 0 2 , then such a contract is equivalent to (f 1 + f 0 2 ; f 2 f 0 2 ). 18 A contract with an opt-out clause can be implemented via an auction, in which the innovator …rst announces the period 2 payment f 2 and then invites bids such that the winning bid becomes the period 1 payment f 1 . In case (ii) ; we separate f 2 further into two regions: a) f 2
(ii:a) f 2 l 2 : If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost of c 1 , then he gets l f 2 ; if he opts out, then he gets 2 . Since l f 2 2 ; it is optimal for the original licensee to continue the original license. This means that (ii:b) f 2 > l 2 : If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost of c 1 , then he gets l f 2 ; if he opts out, then he gets 2 . Since l f 2 < 2 ; the original licensee's right to use the old innovation has no value and he will opt out the initial contract.
This means that
In period 1, a …rm is willing to
for an exclusive license. At the same time,
Hence, the total licensing revenue is
Last, it is also easy to verify that LF is continuous at f 2 = l 2 :
Lemma 6 If 1 2 > 0; then any equilibrium long-term …xed-fee exclusive contract (f 1 ; f 2 )
with an opt-out clause and f 2 M (c 1 ) 1 is equivalent to a short-term exclusive contract with a …xed fee of f 1 :
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee can obtain is M (c 1 ) f 2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out. Since 1 M (c 1 ) f 2 ; the contract will be terminated after period 1.
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee can obtain is l f 2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l f 2 < l + 1 M (c 1 ) < 2 ; the initial contract will also be terminated after period 1.
Lemma 7 If 1 2 < 0; then there exists a long-term …xed-fee exclusive contract that replicates the benchmark outcome.
Proof. Consider a long-term …xed-fee contract (f 1 ; f 2 ) with
If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee can obtain is M (c 1 ) f 2 = 2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out.
Since 1 < 2 ; the contract will be continued after period 1 and thus the original licensee is willing to pay f 1 = M (c 1 ) + 2 in period 1. Also, we obtain that 2 = f 2 = M (c 1 ) 2 :
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee can obtain is l f 2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l M (c 1 )+ 2 < 2 ; the initial contract will be terminated after period 1 and the original licensee's period 2 surplus is 2 . This again means that the original licensee is willing to pay M (c 1 ) + 2 in period 1, so we obtain that
; the innovator's incentive to invest in period 2 is optimal. Therefore, the given contract replicates the benchmark outcome.
Using the above lemmas, we obtain the following result for …xed-fee contracts.
Proposition 3 For homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models, (i) If 1 2 0; then there exists a long-term …xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome; (ii) if 1 2 > 0; then a short-term contract is optimal among …xed-fee licenses.
The intuition for the above result is easy to understand. As shown in the simple example, in a long-term …xed-fee contract, the innovator has an incentive to over-invest in order to make the initial license obsolete. To mitigate this incentive, the innovator can increase f 2 ; the continuation fee on the initial license. But too high a continuation fee will lead the original licensee to terminate the initial contract regardless of the innovation outcome, replicating a short-term contract. Hence f 2 can not exceed M (c 1 ) 1 . On the other hand, the continuation fee that allows the innovator to replicate the benchmark outcome is
The two conditions can both be met only if
19 otherwise a long-term …xed-fee contract is at best as pro…table as a short-term one.
As shown in the proof, the optimal …xed-fee contract depends on comparing the costs of technology leakage, especially 1 2 and M (c 1 ) l : In homogenous good, conjectural variation models, we have Assumption 2 and 3, which signi…cantly reduce the number of 19 It should also be noted that the continuation fee does not have to be positive. In fact, if M (c 1 ) < 2 , then the optimal continuation fee will be negative; or to put it di¤erently, the continuation fee will be greater than the termination fee. cases to consider. For more general models, the results are analogous, but the proof are somewhat tedious, so we leave them in the appendix.
C. Royalty Licenses
Next we consider the optimality of short-term and long-term royalty licensing schemes. We will use a result attributed to Kamien and Tauman (1986) : in an one-innovation licensing game, under Cournot competition with a linear demand, the licensing revenue from royalty R(k) (r) on a drastic innovation that reduces the production cost from c 0 to c 1 is maximized at r = (a c 1 ) =2 and k = n for a maximum of
a. Short-term Royalty
Like a short-term …xed-fee license, short-term royalty contracts last only one period, but they generally admit more licensees in period 1. Hence, in period 2, more than one …rms may have access to the part of cost saving that is irreversible. This makes an explicit solution to the period 2 licensing game di¢ cult to obtain. Therefore, we simply compare the two licensing schemes and rule out short-term royalty as a possible optimal scheme.
Lemma 8 Short-term royalty is less pro…table than short-term …xed-fee exclusive licensing.
Proof. Recall that the innovator's total licensing revenue net of investment is
2 ) 2 : Our plan of the proof is to show that all three terms, 1 ; 2 and 0 2 , are lower under short-term royalty (SR) than under short-term …xed-fee exclusive licensing (SF ) and therefore the same must be true for according to Lemma 3.
First, it is easy to see that The intuition behind the proof goes as follows: when compared with short-term …xed-fee licensing, short-term royalty generates a smaller period 1 licensing revenue and leads to a greater degree of technology leakage, which lowers the licensing revenue in period 2 regardless of the innovation outcome. In particular, under a …xed-fee contract the innovator is able to capture a licensee's gain from technology leakage, whereas under a royalty the innovator is unable to. This, however, suggests that a two-part tari¤ can potentially improve upon pure royalty, an observation that we will return to in Section V.
b. Long-term Royalty
Under a long-term royalty scheme, a licensee is entitled to use the period 1 innovation of c 1 for both periods and pay r 1 (reps. r 2 ) for every unit of output produced in period 1 (reps. 2).
Here we allow the royalty rate to change because the optimal royalty rate varies with market demand, which may be di¤erent across periods. However, in the constant demand case we consider in this model the two royalty rates coincide. More importantly, they are shown to be the same as the royalty rate that maximizes revenue in a one-innovation licensing game.
Lemma 9 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, the optimal royalty rate in each period is r = (a c 1 ) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue is
under Bertrand competition, the optimal royalty rate in each period is r = (a c 1 ) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then 2 = R (r 2 ).
2 . In order to …nd the optimal royalty rate in period 2, we separate the possible choice of r 2 into two regions: (i) r 2 r or (ii) r 2 < r ; where r = (a c 1 ) =2 is the optimal royalty rate in a one-innovation licensing game.
(i) If r 2 r ; then the period 2 innovation c 2 is drastic against an original licensee's total cost c 1 + r 2 ; since p M (c 2 ) < p M (c 1 ) c 1 + r 2 . Therefore, if the period 2 innovation is successful, then the licensing revenue from it is maximized via a …xed-fee exclusive license.
We can see that the innovator's total pro…ts LR increases with R (r 2 ); since
Therefore, r 2 should be chosen so as to maximize R (r 2 ); i.e., r 2 = r : Thus,
(ii) In order for r 2 < r to be a pro…table deviation from r , we must have
2 ; a contradiction. The …rst inequality is due to Eq. (4) and the second is due to
Under Bertrand competition,
Royalty contracts generally cannot replicate the benchmark outcome under Cournot competition. In standard one-innovation models, they are inferior to contracts based on a …xed fee or an auction 20 . But in a model with sequential innovations, a long-term royalty contract can avoid both the technology leakage problem in a short-term contract and the timeconsistency problem in a …xed-fee contract. Intuitively, the use of royalty to collect payments on an ongoing basis eliminates the innovator's commitment problem. It is this advantage that makes royalty a potentially optimal licensing scheme.
It should be noted that the licensing revenue obtained in Eq. (5) is likely to be the lower bound for a long-term royalty contract. If renegotiations are allowed, the innovator can potentially increase her revenue. For example, in the above discussion, we have implicitly assumed that the innovator cannot change the licensing scheme for the period 1 innovation in period 2 if the new innovation is not successful. Now suppose that the innovator can modify licensing contracts with individual licensees, then it is optimal to move from the royalty scheme to a …xed-fee exclusive licensing in period 2. This change will increase the period 2 licensing revenue without a¤ecting the period 1 royalty rate and thus may increase the innovator's total pro…ts. Under Cournot competition, it can be shown that the innovator's total revenue will then become R (r ) + 1
; which is greater than LR obtained in Eq.(5) ; since
D. Summary of results and Comparative Statics
Now we summarize the comparison of di¤erent licensing schemes and discuss how the choice of licensing schemes varies with the model parameters. In so doing, we also provide some potential testable hypotheses, which can serve as guidance for future empirical work.
Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, (i) If 1 2 < 0; then the optimal licensing contract is a long-term …xed-fee contract with an opt-out clause, where For any …xed-fee contract, short-term or long-term, the payo¤ of the innovator stays the same for any size of oligopoly and is bounded away from the benchmark pro…t, but the payo¤ from a long-term royalty always increases in n; the size of the oligopoly, and can be made arbitrarily close to the benchmark pro…t by increasing n: Therefore, even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion, royalty licensing can be more pro…table than …xed-fee contracts when the size of the oligopoly is su¢ ciently large.
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Corollary 1 Denote byñ the size of the oligopoly such that
Under Cournot competition with linear demand, @ñ=@ < 0:
Proof. From Proposition 4, we get @ @ ñ = (n + 1) 1 + 2 (n + 1) (A 1) + ( 1 2 ) 2 (n + 1) 2 = ((n + 1) (1 + 2A ) + 2 n) <
0:
When we vary the parameter governing the probability of innovation, we …nd that nonexclusive royalty contracts are optimal for higher levels of innovation. The reason is that increasing the rate of innovation magni…es the innovator's incentive to engage in R&D, thereby exacerbating the over-investment problem under …xed-fee contracts. This suggests that industries where sequential innovations are common are more likely to use non-exclusive royalty contracts. Although there is no direct evidence to support this prediction, Anand and Khanna (2000) do …nd that the incidence of exclusivity varies considerably across industries. 22 In Computers (18%) and Electronics (16%), two industries that are well known for sequential innovations (Bessen 2004, Bessen and Maskin 2000) , exclusive transfers are much less common than in the other industries (38%).
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Our model also suggests that exclusive contracts may be more likely used in industries that have strong intellectual property protection so that technology leakage is of less concern.
This hypothesis is compatible with the pattern of licensing observed by Anand and Khanna (2000) : the chemical industries, which have high invent-around costs and patents that deliver strong appropriability (Levin et al. 1987 , Cohen et al. 2000 , also have higher incidences of exclusive licensing than other industries.
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V. Discussion
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of relaxing some of our assumptions made in the basic model. Our results appear robust to these extensions.
A. Multiple Fixed-Fee Licenses
For ease of exposition, we only allowed the innovator to sell an exclusive …xed-fee license on the initial innovation in the main results. Here we consider the possibility that the innovator sells multiple …xed-fee licenses in period 1. First, if these licenses are short-term, then their optimality will not change our results. Second, if these licenses are long-term, then the industry pro…ts in period 2 will be lower than the monopoly pro…t if the new innovation is not successful; in itself, it lowers the innovator's potential licensing revenue; at the same time, it also creates incentive for the innovator to over-invest. In the appendix, we prove that issuing multiple long-term …xed-fee licenses is never optimal in our model. 23 Anand and Khanna (2000) o¤er an alternative explanation based on Katz and Shapiro (1986) : network externalities are important in the computer and electronics industries and thus may have led …rms to license technologies non-exclusively, with the aim of 'setting the standard'early on. Note that the two explanation are not mutually exclusive. 24 It should be noted, however, that the two factors, sequential innovation and technology leakage, may be confounding each other in explaining the above pattern of licensing, since Anand and Khanna (2000) 's study concentrates on only three industries: Chemicals, Computers and Electronics. Further research is needed to identify which of the two factors is more responsible for the observed pattern.
Our current analysis has been limited to drastic innovations in period 1. If the innovation in period 1 is not drastic, then it may no longer be optimal to o¤er an exclusive license in period 1. 25 Instead, a …xed-fee license may be o¤ered to multiple …rms, either as a long-term contract or a short-term contract. A detailed analysis will be complicated and is beyond the scope of this paper. 26 However, the basic trade-o¤ between the value of the initial innovation and the incentive to engage in future innovations remains the same. More importantly, we …nd that short-term royalty is never optimal even if the period 1 innovation is non-drastic, as shown in the appendix, while short-term …xed-fee licensing can be optimal when there is no technology leakage. Therefore, we expect our result that royalties on average have a longer duration than …xed-fee contracts to continue to hold.
C. Shifts in Market Demand
Another possibility that we want to consider is the change in the size of the market across two periods. As long as the period 2 demand is common knowledge, our results do not change qualitatively. Under both short-term and long-term …xed-fee schemes, the innovator is able to extract the entire period 1 monopoly pro…t as her licensing revenue. Therefore, the size of the period 1 monopoly pro…t does not a¤ect the comparison between short-term and long-term …xed-fee contracts. Royalty contracts are slightly more complicated, since they involve a trade-o¤ between resolving the time-consistency problem in period 2 and lowering licensing revenue in period 1, but it is not di¢ cult to see that royalties are more likely to be used when the market demand is larger in period 2.
One trivial exception is the possibility of delayed licensing, i.e. the innovator can choose not to o¤er any license in period 1 and only o¤er licenses after the outcome of the period 25 In Kamien and Tauman (1986) , it has been shown that a …xed-fee license sold to multiple …rms is optimal in a one-period game if the innovation is not drastic. 26 The major complication involves solving the period 2 competition outcome with four di¤erent types of …rms, whose marginal costs can be any of c 0 ; c 1 ; c 2 and c 0 .
2 innovation is realized. Such a delay allows the innovator to get the same expected net pro…t in period 2 as in the benchmark case, though she loses the monopoly pro…ts in period 1. Clearly, if the market demand in period 2 is su¢ ciently large relative to the period 1 demand, then delayed licensing can be optimal. In the case of constant market demand delayed licensing is not optimal, since the revenue loss from delayed licensing is M (c 1 ) and
where the last term is the revenue loss from a long-term …xed-fee contract with an upfront payment.
D. Two-part Tari¤
In this model, the licensing policies are con…ned to either pure …xed fees or pure royalty.
Here we discuss what happens if the innovator can use two-part tari¤s, i.e., a combination of …xed fees and royalties, as a possible payment scheme. 27 Since both …xed fee and royalty are special cases of the more general licensing scheme, the innovator cannot do worse by having the ability to use the combination of the two. The question is therefore about which existing licensing scheme can be improved by its combination with the other. First, it is clear that any pure …xed-fee contracts cannot be improved by adding a positive royalty, for otherwise the fee currently set could not have been optimal; second, royalty contracts can potentially become more pro…table since the innovator can use the …xed-fee part of a two-part tari¤ to extract licensees'pro…ts. Thus, allowing two-part tari¤s increases the circumstances under which contracts with positive royalty rates are used. In fact, Vishwasrao (2007) …nds that contracts of longer duration are generally associated with a combination of fees and royalties rather than royalties alone. Our model provides a useful starting point to understand her empirical …nding.
27 A two-part tari¤ can be implemented via an auction plus royalty policy where the innovator …rst announces the level of royalty and then auctions o¤ one or more licenses so that the upfront fee that a licensee pays is its winning bid (Sen and Tauman 2007) .
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the literature on technology licensing by adding to the literature on the duration of contracts, sequential innovations and a model of technology leakage. We show in this framework that it may be optimal for the innovator to limit the length of …xed-fee licenses to less than that of the underlying patent. We …nd that longterm, but not short-term, royalty contracts can be optimal, even under complete information and risk neutrality, because they allow the innovator to resolve a time-consistency problem caused by sequential innovation and technology leakage. This implies that royalty contracts are on average of longer duration than …xed-fee contracts, a result generally consistent with empirical …ndings.
It has long been recognized that the market of technology licensing is imperfect (e.g., Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983) . While other papers in the literature of technology licensing have dwelt on incomplete information, moral hazard, risk and uncertainty, our paper focuses on the irreversibility of technology transfer and the incentive to engage in sequential innovations. In particular, we introduce the notion of technology leakage, which is shown to be an important determinant in an innovator's choice of licensing contracts. Nonetheless, it remains an under-explored topic, which we believe will lead to fruitful researches.
The model presented here has made strong assumptions that can potentially relaxed.
First, one may examine whether our results extend beyond the arti…cial two-period model.
Second, in our model, technology leakage is studied in detail only when one …rm has a cost advantage over other …rms hence an exclusive license is the best form of contract. It can be challenging yet worthwhile to quantify technology leakage in more general cases. On a related point, the optimal contract when there is cost asymmetry among potential licensees deserves more attention in the literature. 28 Third, one can extend the analysis by allowing more general licensing schemes, including two-part tari¤s. Last, we have contented ourselves with a positive analysis, but new and interesting questions will arise in a normative analysis.
These questions are left for future research.
optimal licensing mechanism when a buyer can make bids for multiple licenses, but the equilibrium he considers is not subgame-perfect.
same argument used in the proof of Lemma 8, we can then conclude that the short-term …xed-fee licensing scheme must be more pro…table than the short-term royalty.
Denote by k the optimal number of licensees in a one-innovation game when …xed-fee licensing is used. We have R(n) < F F (k ) according to Kamien and Tauman (1986) .
Consider a short-term royalty scheme SR that issues k royalty licenses in period 1. If k > k ; then a short-term …xed-fee contract with k licensees generates a greater period 1 licensing revenue and has smaller technology leakage. Now if k < k ; then we can consider a short-term …xed-fee contract with k licensees. The period 1 licensing revenue is
where p is the equilibrium price and q (resp. q 0 ) is the quantity produced by a licensee (resp. non-licensee), while
where q (n) (c 0 ) is Cournot quantity with n identical …rms whose costs are c 0 : Since k < k ;
we have p > c 0 (Kamien and Tauman 1986 ). In addition, q > max[q 0 ; q (n) (c 0 )]: Hence 
:
Under Bertrand competition, any …xed-fee license must be exclusive regardless of whether the innovation is drastic, so the proof used in the drastic innovation case also applies here.
B The cost of technology leakage in Homogenous Good,
Conjectural Variation Oligopoly Models
In the main text, we make assumptions on the costs of technology leakage. Here we verify that these assumptions are met in homogenous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models including Cournot competition with linear demand and Bertrand competition. 
C More General Classes of Downstream Competition
In the main text, we have focused on the case of homogenous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models, which allows us to impose restrictions on the costs of technology leakage.
For completeness, in this appendix, we solve for the optimal …xed-fee licensing contracts without restricting the nature of downstream competition. In addition to generalizing our main result, the following results further illustrate the important role played by technology leakage in our model.
